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 1 
Introduction   
Across academic disciplines and policy fields, challenges and responses are currently being framed 
in terms of weak and failing statehood and a consequent need for ‘statebuilding.’ This paper 
reviews one specific aspect of this trend- the concept of fragile states that has recently been put 
forward by development agencies. The term fragile state is used by donors to refer to states that are 
unable or unwilling to adopt policies and institutions believed necessary for development. Around 
this concept, a fragile states agenda- a framework for why and how donors should engage with such 
countries has been developed.  
 
The current concern with ‘state failure’, of which the fragile state agenda is part, spans across 
different disciplines and is therefore preoccupied with a variety of issues. Broadly, a debate within 
the development field has focused on the role and capabilities of the state in bringing about 
economic development. Another debate originates in security and peacebuilding fields and looks at 
the ability of states in preventing and overcoming violent conflict. Yet one more debate has centred 
on the ability and willingness of states to upheld human rights. While all these discussions are 
framed in a language of state failure and state building, their focus is different- and correspondingly, 
their definition of ‘failure’ varies.  Despite this, a meta-narrative of state failure has been 
established on top of the disciplinary debates. This meta-narrative presents all ills; human rights 
abuses, terrorism, poverty and violence as caused by a generalised condition of state failure. 
Solutions are equally generalised; statebuilding is conceived in a checklist manner, where 
enhancing state capability (and willingness) in all fields is widely assumed to be mutually 
reinforcing. Although  rooted in the development debate, the fragile states agenda also draws upon 
this meta-narrative, claiming that fragile states’ inability to promote development have 
ramifications for conflict, Western security and so on. Improving the state’s ability or willingness to 
bring about development, it is therefore argued, will also support the states ability ‘to deliver’ in 
these other fields.  
 
This discussion of the fragile states agenda thus proceeds in three main parts. The first part of the 
paper outlines some of the donor considerations that served as the setting for the fragile states 
agenda. Key elements of this setting includes the findings of the aid effectiveness paradigm that 
have served to defined a standard against which state fragility is diagnosed, a quest amongst donors 
for new approaches to ‘ownership’, and an increased focus within the development discourse on 
institutions, and more recently- politics. The second part discusses how the framework and 
strategies set out in the fragile states agenda resonates with the broader academic debates around the 
role of the state in development. Here, the paper argues that the agenda’s endorsement of a specific 
institutional and policy framework is problematic both in relation to content (policies) and process 
(‘politics’).Thirdly, the paper assesses the claims that the fragile states agenda makes in relation to 
reducing conflict. Recognising such claims as part of a larger meta-narrative of state failure, the 
paper argues that this meta-narrative has obstructed a more historicised understanding of 
statebuilding. There is little evidence that state formation historically has been achieved through the 
simultaneous establishment of a set of functions associated with the modern state. In fact some of 
the objectives currently being promoted in the name of statebuilding can be conflicting in the short 
term. Therefore, statebuilding should be understood as a constantly renegotiated process driven and 
impeded by variety of social and political interests, rather than the attainment of a set of formal state 
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The Fragile State Agenda: evolution and key elements  
Over the last two years, a number of donors such as the World Bank, DFID, USAID and AUSAID 
have developed strategies tailored to meet the challenges of states defined as “fragile”. A common 
agenda for dealing with fragile states coalesced as the aid community decided on a set of principles, 
designed to serve as a framework for international engagement in fragile states at an OECD Senior 
Level Forum in January 20051. The underlying assumptions and central arguments adopted by 
donors in relation to the fragile state concept can be summarised as follows:  
 
Fragile states represent a particular challenge for donors, and therefore require specific attention 
and policy interventions.  Because of poor leadership, lack of capacity or both, fragile states have 
inadequate or inappropriate policies and institutions.  As a result, aid is not effective and 
traditional modes of development cooperation where donors align to partner government strategies 
do not work well. 2 Moreover, the inability or unwillingness of fragile states to perform minimum 
state functions also have ramifications for internal conflict insofar as fragile states foster many of 
the underlying causes of conflict, including   underdevelopment, discontent and a general absence 
of the rule of law.  Fragile states also constitute a threat to international security by providing both 
the root causes and enabling environments for terrorism and other security threats, such as 
organised crime. Donors therefore cannot ignore these countries. Since previous donor approaches 
have been largely unsuccessful, new strategies especially designed to reduce the fragility of such 
states must be adopted.  
Focus on the State  
The fragile states agenda partly departs from a renewed focus on state within the development 
community, which made its way into the mainstream debate in the mid-1990s.  Where the so-called 
Washington consensus endorsed a set of neoliberal economic policies such as fiscal austerity, trade 
liberalisation, privatisation and market deregulation, thus focusing on reducing the role and 
influence of the state vis-a vis the market, the gradually emerging post-Washington consensus has 
emphasised the complementary role of state and market in providing for development.  The post-
Washington consensus holds that economic growth can only take place with the combined presence 
of sound economic policy and good institutions, and thus emphasises the need for ‘institution-
building.’ For instance the 1997 World Development Report The State in a Changing World states 
that ‘good government is a vital necessity for development’.3 Economists associated with the post-
Washington consensus have also been more positively inclined towards certain state regulatory 
functions and have stressed the importance of gradual economic reforms rather than rapid 
liberalisation.4  
 
Overall, the set of policies commonly associated with the post-Washington consensus represents a 
modification, rather than a rejection of its predecessor, with little changes in monetary and fiscal 
policies, and a continuing endorsement of free trade, privatisation and market deregulation.5  Yet 
the declaratory emphasis on the institutions and statebuilding is relatively new within the 
development community and has lent itself to a discourse framing the lack of development in terms 
of state failure: Mainstream development debate has increasingly come to assume that development 
is contingent on a specific kind of state,6 which includes a benign and competent government and 
                                                     
1OECD/DAC (2005a) 
2 Picciotto et. al.  (2005)  
3 World Bank ( 1997) p. 15  
4 See for instance Stiglitz ( 2002)  
5 Fine et. al (2001) 
6 Macrae et. al. ( 2004) p. 2 
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efficient and capable institutions, as well as liberal economic policies.7  The absence of these (often 
highly specified) conditions is seen to constitute state failure in developmental terms.8  
The aid effectiveness debate 
The fragile state agenda must be understood as part of this overall focus with state failure within the 
development field. More specifically, however, the fragile states agenda has been driven by the so-
called aid effectiveness paradigm. This paradigm has been preoccupied with providing criteria for 
identifying “poor performers”- countries with policies and institutions seen to be detrimental to the 
effective utilisation of aid. Such criteria have subsequently been used by the fragile state agenda to 
identify “state fragility.”  
 
Researchers have long examined the effect of development aid on growth, but have produced little 
consensus.9 Yet since the 1990s, a body of research associated primarily with economists working 
with the World Bank gained immense policy influence. Prominent within this aid effectiveness 
paradigm were Burnside and Dollar’s findings that aid had little effect on growth (which was seen 
as a key to poverty reduction) in the absence of good policies (inflation, budget balance and trade 
openness)10  Later research by Collier and Dollar added the factor of quality of institutions. They 
concluded that aid is only effective in countries with good policies and institutions. 11 However, 
Collier and Dollar based their claims on different set of indicators than Burnside and Dollar, using 
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).12  
 
The aid effectiveness paradigm remains contested. Findings that aid does not have any effect on 
growth in the absence of good policies have not been widely replicated, 13 and the paradigm has also 
been challenged on methodological grounds.14 In addition, the aid effectiveness paradigm assumes 
that development can be measured in terms of growth, something that is questioned by those who 
see development to be a wider end with regards to things such as security, political inclusion and 
education, in short- human development. More specifically, there has also been unease with the 
CPIA indicators. The CPIA is a tool that the World Bank uses to evaluate recipient countries. Its 16 
different components assess economic management, public sector management and institutions, 




                                                     
7 Macrae et. al. ( 2004) p. 2 
8 Ibid.  
9 Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani ( 2004)  
10 Burnside and Dollar ( 2000) 
11 Collier and Dollar (2002)  
12 Hagen and Pedersen ( 2002)  
13 Lockwood p.46  (2005)  
14 See for instance Hansen and Tarp ( 2000), or Clemens et al ( 2004) Clemens et. al. suggest for instance that aggregate 
analysis of aid is inappropriate and that humanitarian aid and aid towards social development will necessarily have 
different short term effects on growth than aid directed towards productive sectors or state budgets. 




BOX 1:  2005 CPIA CRITERIA 
 
A. Economic Management 
1. Macroeconomic Management 
2. Fiscal Policy 
3. Debt Policy 
B. Structural Policies 
4. Trade 
5. Financial Sector 
6 Business Regulatory Environment 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 
7. Gender Equality 
8. Equity of Public Resource Use 
9. Building Human Resources 
10. Social Protection and Labour 
11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 
12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 
13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
15. Quality of Public Administration 
16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 
Source: World bank,  CPIA Questionnaire 2005. 
 
 
The CPIA ratings have been criticised for being arbitrary and subjective. While the evaluations 
themselves are becoming more standardised and transparent, 15 they ultimately rest on subjective 
judgements. Moreover their analytical and policy relevance is still questioned (see below).  
 
Despite such controversies, the findings of the aid effectiveness paradigm have been very influential 
on policy making. Initially the aid effectiveness paradigm supported a move towards the so-called 
selectivity approach as donors (particular the World Bank and the US) channelled aid to a cluster of 
‘good performers’ in an effort to maximize the output per unit of aid.  In countries where policies 
and institutions were seen to be inappropriate, the state was circumvented and funds were 
channelled as short-term humanitarian aid. Soon, donors grew unhappy with the selectivity 
approach, seeing that such total disengagement from recipient governments could result in 
unacceptable human costs16 and led to few long-term changes. It also frustrated institutional targets 
for aid disbursements. Adding to this was the widespread sense that such countries could constitute 
a security threat to the West, particularly after the 11 September attacks in the US and the 
subsequent ‘war on terror’. Thus, a growing trend has been to emphasise the need to reengage with 
these “poor performers”. In accordance with the premises of the aid effectiveness paradigm, 
however, donors have stressed that such reengagement must be designed with the intent to improve 
aid effectiveness in what have subsequently been defined as ‘fragile states.’ 
                                                     
15 Since 2001, and following critique that ratings were overly subjective, the country teams who are doing the rating have 
been given written guidance in the form of criteria for rates between 1 and 6. They are also required to provide a written 
justification for given scores (‘write ups’). Until recently countries’ rating were only disclosed in the form of quintiles (1-
5). However, from the 2005 CPIA rating onwards, the numerical ratings given for each of the 16 CPIA criteria have been 
disclosed for countries eligible for IDA assistance. The guidelines for CPIA ratings in the 16 fields are available at : 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/CPIA2005Questionnaire.pdf 
16 World Bank:  Fragile states-the LICUS initiative: Overview (http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:20176979~menuPK:511786~pagePK:64
171531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html#status_determined), DFID (2005a) 
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The drivers of the fragile state agenda have been the World Banks’ Low Income Countries Under 
Stress (LICUS) initiative, the OECD/DAC initiative on “difficult partnerships” and the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), all of which are addressing ‘state fragility’ from 
aid effectiveness perspectives.  Launched in 2001, The World Bank’s LICUS initiative used the aid 
effectiveness debate as a starting point. Stating that LICUS countries are ‘characterised by very 
weak policies, institutions and governance’, the Bank’s 2002 LICUS Task Force Report proceeded 
to identify the task at hand: Since ‘aid does not work well in these environments’, the Bank should 
‘facilitate policy and institutional change.’17 For some time, the LICUS unit remained somewhat 
vague on the issue of definitions, refusing to commit to a definite list of LICUS countries. However, 
recently the Bank has stated that ‘LICUS are fragile states with particularly weak policies and 
institutions, scoring less than 3.0 on the CPIA.’18 The Bank now also uses ‘fragile states’ 
interchangeably with the LICUS term. 
 
 The notion that certain policies and institutions are needed for the effective utilisation of aid, and 
that these are expressed in the CPIA criteria, has underpinned other fragile states strategies as well. 
DFID defines fragile states as those ‘where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions 
to the majority of its people, including the poor.’19 This widely quoted definition does not specify 
what core functions could be. For this purpose, DFID draws upon the CPIA framework, generating 
a list of 46 Fragile States, consisting of the countries in the lowest two quintiles in the World Bank 
CPIA list, as well as a separate group of unranked countries. Similarly, the OECD/DAC launched 
an initiative on difficult partnership in 2001, stating that aid is ‘less effective in poor policy 
environments’. The research agenda of this ‘difficult partnership’ initiative was to be cases where 
recipient governments do not have ownership or commitment to pro-poor policies. 20  Initially, the 
OECD/DAC did not make the content of such policies explicit, instead focusing on the 
implementation or non-implementation of the provisions in a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper.21 More recently, the OECD/DAC  initiative has started using the term fragile states and 
broadened its focus to also include states with ‘insufficient capacity’ as well as those seen be 
lacking in political commitment. It has also explicitly defined its caseload as countries with low 
CPIA scores.22 
Ownership and ‘political will’ 
The fragile state agenda as a whole expresses and consolidates a number of donor concerns. Whilst 
drawing upon current emphasis on strengthening institutions, the agenda is also an attempt to deal 
with donor dilemmas with regards to the politics of implementation, and often translates the 
resistance to externally initiated reforms - both with regards to institution-building and economic 
policy - as evidence of fragile statehood. According to the fragile state agenda, donors must actively 
work against national policy in cases where the government appears disinterested in adopting what 
the aid community considers appropriate policies and institutions.  The agenda therefore represents 
an explicit modification of a central tenant of recent aid discourse, that of ownership. A key element 
of current aid modalities, ownership has nonetheless been an ambiguous and controversial concept.  
It emerged as a response to widespread criticism following the first generation of structural 
adjustment lending, which involved substantial economic policy reforms. At the time, the 
                                                     
17 World Bank (2002) 
18 World Bank LICUS website: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:20176979~me
nuPK:511786~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html 
19 DFID ( 2005a)  
20 OECD/DAC (2001) 
21However, since the PRSPs are subject to IFI approval, their content is likely to be endorsed by the CPIAs.  
22 Morcos (2005)  
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adjustment programmes represented unprecedented interventions by aid agencies in the internal 
affairs of developing countries. Nonetheless, the aid community became increasingly aware that 
governments would not always implement the reforms that were a condition of aid and loan 
packages, even if this meant the withholding of aid.23 There was also widespread criticism that these 
reforms were often implemented in a fashion that ran counter to the interest of the poor,24 and that 
their underlying policy assumptions were unsound. Expenditure on social services was often cut, 
and it was argued that externally-driven adjustment undermined the accountability between 
government and the population in developing countries.  
 
Introduced by the 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy initiative, the concept of ownership was an 
attempt to reconcile these two (essentially opposite) set of concerns. Following the introduction of 
ownership, donors would no longer act as policemen towards recipient governments, instead they 
would align with strategies rooted in country priorities. This was intended to address the donor 
community’s belief that government passivity and low involvement in reform design had 
undermined the impact and sustainability of aid programs.25 However, ownership also entailed civil 
society consultations, to ensure that poverty reduction strategies took popular concerns into account. 
Simultaneously an instrument of democratic accountability and of implementation of donor-
initiated reforms, the ownership approach has been criticised for being deceptive as well as 
politically naïve.26 It has been pointed out that the notion of country-led approaches is misleading as 
long as key aspects such as macroeconomic policies remain non-negotiable. In practice, the idea 
that ownership will serve as an instrument for implementation is contradictory. If governments had 
been unwilling to implement reforms before, true ownership (at least by the government, if not the 
general population) would mean continuous non-implementation. To a large extent, donors denied 
this fact by treating implementation as a problem of collective action, rather than conflicting 
objectives. 27 On the other hand, it is argued that the idea that PRSP-driven civil society consultation 
and ‘stakeholder analysis’ can somehow be a catalyst for improved government and /or donor 
accountability is an overly narrow and naïve idea of political processes of change. 28 
 
In any case, donors eventually came to believe that the ownership approach was completely 
inappropriate in countries where the government proved absolutely unwilling to ‘own’ the 
compulsory reform agenda. This conclusion is integral the fragile state agenda. Fragile states 
documents argue that the obstacles that fragile states are facing can be divided into two main 
categories, those with weak capacity and those with a lack of political will. Donors must respond 
accordingly. For instance, the OECD/DAC principles for international engagement in fragile states 
state: 
 
For governments where political will exists and capacity is the main constraint, supporting state-
building means direct support for government plans, budgets, decision-making processes and 
implementing structures. In countries where political will is the main constraint, support for long-
term state-building does not necessarily imply short-term support for the government - but it does 
mean moving beyond repeated waves of humanitarian responses to a focus on how to support and 
strengthen viable national institutions which will be resilient in the longer-term. 29 
 
                                                     
23 Lockwood (2005)  
24 Lockwood ( 2005)  
25 van de Walle (2006) 
26 Jerve (2002) 
27 Collier (2005)  
28 Jerve ( 2002)  
29 OECD/DAC (2005a) p. 2-3.  
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This conditional approach to ownership, which the World Bank and the UNDP has termed 
‘dynamic ownership,’30 diminishes the scope for any genuine country influence, reducing 
ownership to a tool of donor coordination and smooth implementation reserved for ‘willing’ 
governments. This was perhaps a logical solution to the inherent tensions in the ownership concept. 
Nevertheless it is a controversial retreat from donor’s long-stated commitment (however superficial) 
to development rooted in ‘country priorities.’ 
 
In a bid to understand the underlying causes of lack of ownership and ‘political will’ for sustained 
change, the fragile state agenda also stresses the need to utilise political economy analysis. In recent 
years, the larger development community have started to use what is termed Drivers of Change 
(DOC) analysis, (also referred to as political economy analysis.) 31  The stated aim of this DOC 
analysis is to go beyond the level of individuals as champions of reform to examine the role of 
institutions and underlying structural features.32 Much of the DOC analysis draws upon academic 
concepts and frameworks -notably from political science and anthropology. Often, the analyses 
themselves are carried out by academics with substantial country knowledge, and contain in-depth 
accounts of historical and political dynamics. 33 Thus in accordance with these wider trends, most of 
the fragile states policy documents refer to the need for political economy analysis in order to 
understand and address problems of political will. In cases where the recipient government is 
unwilling to implement policies that donors consider necessary for development - the agenda states 
that donors must utilise ‘political economy analysis’ to understand how to promote the desired 
change.  However, as argued below, the fragile state agenda uses political economy analysis in a 
narrow and instrumental way, which greatly curtails the utility of such exercises. 
The fragile state agenda and the broader development 
debate 
Defining the inability or unwillingness of some states to provide the conditions necessary for 
development as fragile statehood implies that a consensus exists on a set of policies and institutions 
that will bring about development. As we have seen, agencies involved in the Fragile State initiative 
use CPIA indicators as a proxy for ‘good institutions and policies’. However, some of the policy 
frameworks endorsed by the CPIA are contested, especially those regarding economic policy and 
the degree of state intervention in the market. This include the high CPIA ratings given for trade 
liberalisation (low tariffs etc.)34, few controls or subsidies on prices, wages, land or labour, 35 and 
few restrictions with regards to public sector procurements.36 These policies are part of neoliberal 
economics and have been controversial since they were first advocated by the international financial 
institutions in the 1980s. Examining the experience of successful developers in East Asia, scholars 
have found evidence that these countries have behaved in ways contrary to neoliberal economics by 
intervening in labour markets, land markets, product markets and financial markets, 37 and by using 
trade policy to protect infant industries at times. 38 Based on these findings, academics and activists 
have accused the international financial institutions for ‘kicking away the ladder’ and denying 
developing countries the space to pursue the same policies. It is therefore important to keep in mind 
                                                     
30 UNDP/ World Bank (2005) p. 4. 
31 OECD/DAC (2005c) p.3. Drivers of Change analysis have so far been used by DFID, SIDA and the World Bank.(ibid.)   
32 DFID ( 2004). 
33 See for instance, DFID’s study on Uganda and the World Bank’s study on Somalia.  
34 World Bank (2005a) p. 11-12. 
35 Ibid. p. 17-18. 
36 Ibid. p. 18. 
37 Lockwood (2005) p. 36, Kohli ( 2004).  
38 Lockwood (2005) p. 36, Kohli (2004). 
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that unwillingness to adhere to donor promoted economic policies is not a widely accepted 
manifestation of developmental state failure.   
 
The social and institutional aspects of the CPIA criteria, such as equity, transparency and non-
corruption, effective resource mobilisation and effective state administration are less controversial. 
Nevertheless, questions with regards to their relevance for development remain.39 Some scholars 
argue that historical evidence does not support any causal connection between the policies 
associated with ‘good governance’ and economic development. For instance, Grindle points to the 
experience of China and Vietnam, where insecure property rights and contracts, as well as extensive 
corruption have coexisted with rapid economic development. She also suggests that while civil 
service reform was initiated in the US in the 1880s, it took up to another 60 years for that country to 
establish an effective civil service system.40  
 
Increasingly, scholars  comparing the different experiences of the fast growing countries in East 
Asia with for instance Sub-Saharan Africa countries  have found that successful ‘developmental 
states’ cannot readily be reduced to certain policy or institutional models or the relative size of 
states. 41 In general, the extensive market interventions- at least prior to structural adjustment - by 
African states did not lead to development, whereas extensive intervention (although to various 
degree) amongst the East Asian developers did. Some researchers thus suggest that ‘what has 
mattered more [than the size of intervention] is the quality of state interventions [in the market], 
which again has depended on analytical capacity, on resource mobilisation by the state, on the 
politics of the state and on the balance of material interests driving that politics.’ 42 Hence, the 
debate surrounding the scope of the state intervention in development and appropriate institutional 
design has largely been complemented by a debate on the underlying politics and social basis of the 
state.43  
 
The endorsement of the so-called drivers of change approach by donors must be seen as part of this 
focus on political dynamics. To a large extent, however, the donor community in general and the 
fragile state agenda in particular have incorporated what they refer to as political economy analysis 
into their existing frames of reference.  In fragile states policy documents and much of the other 
DOC analysis, the political economy approach is used instrumentally as a tool of policy 
implementation. For instance, the 2002 LICUS task force suggests that donors must utilise socio-
political analysis in order to identify constituencies for reform (i.e. towards improving CPIA- 
ratings) .44  The paper warns against efforts towards reforms that are detrimental to powerful groups, 
who are likely to block them. Rather, the role of donors must be to communicate the benefits of 
reform in cases of ignorance, where those who might benefit does not realise it. 45 Similarly, the 
OECD principles  refer to the ‘drivers of change’ approach, emphasising the need for ‘sound 
political analysis’ in order to identify whether constraints are related to capacity or political will and 
the different needs of countries recovering from conflict, political crisis or poor governance, etc. 
While the OECD principles appear more ‘context driven’ the direction of reform remains the same, 
and references to needs assessment testify to analysis of a technical, rather than political nature.  
 
The assumption that the aid community has already identified a priori the changes required for 
development reduces ‘political economy analysis’ to an instrument of implementation, rather than 
                                                     
39 See Grindle (2005), Khan ( 2005) and Unsworth (2005).  
40 Grindle in ODI ( 2006).  
41 Cramer and Goodhand (2003) p. 133. 
42 Cramer and Goodhand ( 2003) p. 133. 
43 See, in particular, the ODI seminar series on developmental states http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/states_06/index.html 
44 World Bank (2002). 
45As an example, the paper mentions facilitating negations over privatisation between trade unions and the government, 
and the training of journalists in economic issues.(World Bank 2002 p. 18). 
CMI WORKING PAPER THE AID AGENCIES AND THE FRAGILE  STATES AGENDA WP 2006:  21 
 9 
understanding.46 Thus, insofar as ‘political economy ’ is an subject of analysis and explanation, 
non-implementation of reforms, such as reducing corruption and change of economic policy is often 
explained by ‘bad leadership’- with elites’ short -term quest for power and riches typically 
juxtaposed to a generalised concept of the public good- the latter seen to be embodied in the CPIA 
criteria. In the words of the OECD; in fragile states ‘development objectives play little role 
compared with prolongation of power, with the result that partner governments do not have credible 
commitment to effective policies and their implementation.’47  To the extent that this discourse 
analyses ‘politics’ beyond diagnoses of lacking political will and ‘bad leaders’, it often refers to 
neopatrimonialism. An influential concept within the ‘politics of development debate,’ the term is 
applied mainly with reference to Sub-Saharan Africa.48  The neopatrimonialism thesis suggests that 
most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practices are incorporated into 
bureaucratic practices. In particular, the notion that Africa’s persistent neopatrimonialism is 
blocking the continent’s transition to development has gained widespread influence.  It is held that 
neopatrimonialism is inimical to development, as political legitimacy, rather than being premised on 
efficient state administration and delivery of public goods, builds on the distribution of patronage 
through personalized loyalty structures. However, on its own, neopatrimonialism is a description 
rather than a causal account of underdevelopment or ‘state failure.’  Outside of a historical and 
material context it risks being essentialist, promoting the idea that there is something inherently 
‘wrong’ with African politics. Thus, historically grounded research have suggested that 
neopatriomonialism must be understood in the context of state formation in Africa, as a legacy of 
indirect rule,49and also as closely related to structural economic factors. For instance, the small size 
of the capitalist sector in developing countries vis- a vis self-subsistence and informal small-scale 
economic activities means that allocation of resources seldom takes place through the government 
budget.50 
 
It is thus unlikely that a transformation to a rational-legal state can take place independently of an 
economic transformation. An integrated approach to political economy analysis i.e. one that puts the 
economy back into ‘political economy’, would question the idea that development can be achieved 
by ‘skipping straight to Weber.’51 i.e. solely through the transformation of  politics towards publicly 
oriented leaders who exercise ‘good governance’.  For instance, Khan takes issue with such ‘neo- 
Weberian’ assumptions, arguing that there are ‘no examples of successful transitions to prosperity 
based on following the good governance route to reform’.52 Instead he claims that a common feature 
of rapidly developing countries has been the ability of states to allocate resources to productive 
groups, and that state officials have often united with emerging capitalists on a profit-sharing basis. 
This suggests that the borders between politics and economics, and between selfish and 
development-oriented elites are more complex than the fragile states agenda assumes.  More 
generally, Unsworth asserts that academics and policymakers are ‘far from identifying the key 
causal linkages – between institutions and growth, growth and corruption, democracy and poverty 
reduction – and which reforms to prioritise in different country circumstances.’53  
 
If donor engagement is to move beyond the one-size- fits- all agenda advocated by the fragile states 
approach, it is necessary to employ a two-way analysis that explores how change could be achieved 
based on analysis of existing social systems, rather an assumption that developmental states can be 
                                                     
46 Some more historically grounded work on drivers of change goes beyond this- see for instance Unsworth (2005). 
However other state that ‘donors know ‘what’ is necessary to realise [poverty reduction] but they do not know ‘how’ to 
bring about the changes’ ( Warrener 2004 p. iii).  
47 OECD/DAC (2001)p. 4.  
48 Chabal and Daloze, (1999) Bratton and van de Walle (1994). 
49 Kohli, (2004). 
50 Khan (2005).  
51 Pritchett and Woolcock (2003). 
52 Khan (2005) p.19. Emphasis in original.  
53 Unsworth ( 2005).  
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reduced to the implementation of a universal institutional and policy model, which will produce the 
same effects in all cases. 54 This is the approach of more historically grounded political economy 
analysis.55  Indeed, the starting point of a ‘proper’ political economy approach is the close inter-
relationship among political, administrative and economic variables.56 Such an approach precludes 
isolating ‘politics’ or bad leaders as an autonomous source of explanation or change, 
acknowledging that transformations cannot take place independently of structural and economic 
factors . However as long as the fragile state agenda commits itself to a fixed reform model it 
cannot incorporate the dynamic relationship between political and economic change.  
Fragile states and conflict 
The fragile state agenda makes frequent claims to address not only development but also conflict.57 
Such assertions run along two, interrelated themes. First, it is argued that, as the lack of 
development is a cause of conflict, the agenda’s efforts to promote development will also have the 
effect of reducing conflict. Secondly, the fragile states agenda draws upon a meta-narrative of state 
failure, where a general condition of state failure is seen to explain the absence of both security and 
development.  
 
The last decade has seen a convergence of development and security concerns among Western 
policymakers both in an operational and conceptual sense- often referred to as the security -
development nexus. At an operational level, a driving force behind this convergence has been the 
changing international context, which since the early 1990s made possible increased international 
involvement in internal conflict. This new activism fostered a shift within the UN system from an 
emphasis on negotiation /enforcement and monitoring of peace agreements to efforts towards 
wholesale reconstruction of war-affected societies. Agencies from different fields now found 
themselves working within the same space, and increasingly utilising each others policy tools. For 
instance policymakers working with security and military affairs came to recognise that 
consolidating security depended on developing institutions, such as police and the judiciary, and 
strengthening overall institutional structures in the country concerned. In turn, development aid 
agencies, having started to work more directly in conflict-prone or conflict-affected areas began 
acknowledge that their work was dependent on security conditions, and in turn impacted on matters 
of security.58  
 
At times the development-security convergence has also entailed a more problematic conceptual 
shift, suggesting that security and development strategies are essentially addressing the same 
underlying issue. The UN has promoted such a conceptual unification of development and security 
when stating that there can be no development without security, and no security without 
                                                     
54 Khan ( 2005) Brett (2006).  
55 See for instance Unsworth (2005). 
56 Brett ( 2006).  
57 USAID (2005):  “Although conflict is not limited to fragile states, the propensity for a fragile state to experience violent 
conflict is high .When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap 
around the world.” DFID (2005b):  “Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict 
and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism”. DFID (2005a) Fragile states are 
more likely to become unstable and fall prey to criminal and terrorist networks, which aggravate their instability. LICUS 
(2002) : Yet neglect of such countries [fragile states] perpetuates poverty in some of the world’s poorest countries and 
may contribute to the collapse of the state, with adverse regional and even global consequences OECD (2005a) : “Fragile 
states are countries affected by weak governance and institutions where delivering aid is difficult but critical to support 
peace and stability, and to improve the lives of the millions of their citizens who are mired in a vicious circle of conflict, 
poor governance and poverty”. 
58 Uvin (2002) This has led to a proliferation of ‘Do No Harm’ and conflict sensitivity approaches amongst aid agencies, 
particularly NGOs.  
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development.59Yet despite the interface between the security and development fields, notions about 
common objectives are deceptive, and largely due to a shift in presentation.60  Recent years have 
seen frequent contentions by development actors that poverty and underdevelopment cause conflict, 
61 and that development can be ‘a structural form of conflict prevention.’62 This has allowed all 
development-assistance ‘whatever its focus -health, gender, economic growth, education’63 to be 
defined as ‘peacebuilding’ as long as it claims to address the “root causes” of conflict,64 amounting 
to what Peter Uvin calls ‘rhetorical repacking’-the assertion that that development axiomatically 
reduces conflict.65 In the same fashion, the fragile state agenda argues that as fragile states are 
considered the root causes of underdevelopment, addressing state fragility is tantamount to 
peacebuilding.  
 
Nonetheless, the underlying idea- that development is inherently peace-promoting, should not be 
accepted at face value.  Some see the particular economic policies of neoliberalism (such as 
privatisation and liberalisation) as sharpening inequalities and fostering competitive behaviour, thus 
potentially resulting in the re-emergence of conflict.66 In theory, aid agencies have started to 
acknowledge the effects of development policies on the short -term consolidation of security and 
are increasingly referring to the need for ‘sequencing’ and integration of various policy fields in 
such cases,67 although it remains too early to assess the extent to which such references and 
‘integrated planning frameworks’ have led to substantive practical changes. On a more fundamental 
level, scholars have questioned the peace promoting effects of development by pointing to how the 
development process itself can be inherently violent, not only as the challenges to existing power 
structures, rapid distributional changes and erosion of livelihoods can create tensions, but also in an 
endogenous sense as emerging classes use violence to appropriate assets, land and labour, – so-
called ‘primitive accumulation’. 68  Such perspectives turn the assumption that security is a 
precondition for development on its head by suggesting that development has historically been a 
very insecure experience for many people. 
 
The logic of the security –development nexus has also become an integral part of a meta-narrative 
of state failure.  Over the last decade or so, a pervasive view has developed amongst researchers 
and, particularly, policymakers to the effect that certain states are failing to perform the minimum 
functions expected of them. This failure is widely perceived as a prime issue of concern, a point of 
explanation and a target for reform. Yet the preoccupation with such state failure has taken place in 
separate disciplinary and policy fields, and it follows that the focus for identifying failure has 
differed. In particular, there are two different dimensions of state failure that policymakers and 
academics have been preoccupied with: (i) failure of states to promote development, and (ii) failure 
to uphold security or internal sovereignty. The latter has been the focus of agencies and experts 
                                                     
59 See for instance the UN’s High Level Report (UN, 2004) and the Secretary General’s In Larger Freedom ( UN, 2005)  
60 This applies particularly to the OECD principles and the OECD/DAC documents on ‘difficult partnerships’, DFID and 
the World Bank’s LICUS initiative, which have been at the forefront of the fragile state discourse. (An exception is the 
USAID strategy, which adopts a perspective more related to US security interests rather than general development issues ( 
USAID, 2005).  
61 In its influential report Breaking the Conflict Trap ( 2003) the World Bank States: ‘the key root cause of conflict is the 
failure of economic development’ p. 53.  
62 Duffield (2001)p. 121. 
63 Sending (2005).  
64 Sending (2005).  
65Uvin (2002) Interesting in this regard is the World Bank’s LICUS group, who started in 2001 as a initiative to address 
aid effectiveness concerns ( see p. 6) More recently and particularly since the Fragile State Initiative in 2005, LICUS have 
increasingly defined its work in terms of conflict. However a recent evaluation of The World Bank’s LICUS work found 
that the definition of peacebuilding ( and statebuilding) within LICUS is not clear, and that LICUS’s post-conflict work 
overlaps considerably with the Bank’s Postconflict Reconstruction Unit. ( World Bank 2006b).  
66 Paris ( 2004).  
67 See for instance UNDP/ World Bank 2005.  
68 Keen (2001) p. 8. See also Cramer (2006).  
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primarily concerned with security, international relations and conflict prevention. Often, state 
failure in security terms is seen as the end point in a process of reduced state capacity, where 
progressive disintegration of state structures eventually results in the outbreak of violence, at which 
point the state may or may not survive as an institution.69 However, following the debate in the UN 
system over the ‘responsibility to protect’, the object of security has shifted somewhat from the 
state to the individual. Thus, state failure in security terms refers increasingly to the state’s failure to 
discharge its responsibility to protect individuals from physical violence. In recent time, the 
genocide in Rwanda where a strong state apparatus failed spectacularly to ensure the security of the 
population starkly illustrates the difference between the state security and individual security. 
 
The development discourse on state failure, of which the fragile state agenda is a part,  has focused 
on development outcomes and initially evolved largely separate from the security –oriented 
preoccupation with state failure. However the recent emphasis in development circles on 
strengthening public administration fitted nicely with the corresponding focus among security and 
political analysts on effective security institutions and state consolidation. Thus, underpinned by the 
security –development nexus, a meta-narrative of state failure’ has emerged, portraying state failure 
as a singular phenomenon, where failure in one area ineluctably leads to failure in the other. 
According to one report:  
 
 “As violent conflict is often associated with weak and failing states, the rationale of international 
assistance should focus on creating (...) “capable states,” able to provide security, well-being, and 
justice. States unable to provide all three of these functions are prone to instability and violence. 
Thus, international efforts have to help revamp all these functions simultaneously, with the aim to 
strike a sustainable security, political, and socio-economic balance beyond the short-run.”70  
 
Included in this meta-narrative is also a projection of state failure as a key threat to the security of 
Western states,71 perhaps most prominently in the US where the CIA in 2000 commissioned an 
extensive research programme to uncover the causes and characteristics of state failure.72 The 11th 
September attacks and the subsequent focus on ‘weak states’ as providing enabling conditions for 
terrorist activity, have amplified such concerns.  
 
The fragile state agenda draws upon this meta-narrative of state failure. Although the CPIA 
indicators do not include aspects of ‘state failure’ more closely associated with conflict, such as 
political repression or the condition of the security apparatus, the fragile states agenda often 
presents what is sees as state fragility in developmental terms as indistinguishable from a general 
state of state failure across the board. Both the state failure meta-narrative and the security 
development nexus more generally has often translated into a ‘missing link approach’ where the 
emphasis is on comprehensiveness and making sure no fields are left out. The underlying idea is 
that all elements of what is commonly associated with (Western) modernity are mutually 
constitutive.  Particularly in the context of postconflict transitions, it is held that only with all 
elements of a set list on board, can success be achieved. For example, Ghani et al. put forward what 
they see to be ten core functions of the modern state, arguing that:  
 
...failure to perform one or many of these functions leads to the creation and acceleration of a 
vicious cycle. This results in the creation of contending centres of power, the multiplication of 
                                                     
69 This is sometimes described as a taxonomy of weak, failing, failed and collapsed states. 
70 IPA (2004) p. 6.  
71 See for instance Fearon and Laitin (2004). 
72 The authors initially defined state failure as ‘when central state authority collapses for several years’ However, when 
this definition did not allow for a number of cases large enough to produce statistically significant results, the definition 
was broadened as to include revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides. This, 
in many peoples’ view, empties the concept of state failure of much of its meaning. (van Einsiedel, 2005).  
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increasingly contradictory and ineffective decisions-making processes, the lost of trust between 
citizens and the state, the delegitimzation of institutions, the disenfranchisement of the citizenry, and 
ultimately, the resort to violence.’ 73 
 
In contrast;  
 
…when these[ core state] functions are performed in an integrated fashion, a virtuous circle is 
created in which state decisions in the different domains bolster overall enfranchisement and 
opportunity for the citizenry74… 
 
Yet even cursory observation does not support processes of ‘vicious /virtuous circles’ as a general 
rule. Numerous states are experiencing widespread corruption, stagnated economic growth or non-
delivery of state services without succumbing to civil war. In fact, addressing various aspects of 
‘state failure’ can be in conflict which each other, at least in the short term. Policies that may be 
technically sound or are seen to be promoting development objectives, such as army or civil service 
reform, could create political instability and undermine security dimensions of statebuilding.75 
Similarly, transitions towards greater transparency or political accountability involve substantive 
reallocation of power and as such, are often associated with increased levels of violence.  
 
The underlying problem with such missing link approaches to statebuilding is that they are 
inherently devoid of historical content. It is assumed that if the state could only adhere to a certain 
universal standard and deliver abstract public goods such as security, development and ‘the rule of 
law’, support for the state’s subsistence will automatically materialise. Yet there is no analysis of 
the state as a social and historical construct. Implicitly or explicitly, the fragile states agenda and 
much of the policy and academic literature on state failure draws upon a particular version of 
liberal/ social contract model of state formation. The social contract model sees state authority as 
premised on the state meeting certain expectations such as providing welfare, security or 
representation. However, the social contract model gives a stylised account of state formation, and 
tends to be ahistorical. The model’ s  view on state formation/ authority  neglects the fact that many 
rulers  have in fact been illegitimate, at least to large parts of the population, 76 and that historically 
few states have been formed into existence through the provision of the set of functions currently 
associated with modern statehood. The social contract perspective on state formation therefore fails 
to differentiate between the various groups in society that challenge or support different forms of 
statebuilding and their basis and channels of power, both of which often vary significantly.77 What 
is commonly associated with modern statehood; an effective bureaucracy, internal pacification, 
revenue collection and allocation, etc, did not come about simply as a popular demand from the 
general population, but were largely driven by specific political and economic interests.  
 
In a discussion on perspectives on statebuilding, Milliken and Krause78  argue that the social 
contract model can be seen as one of three main academic narratives of state formation. A second 
model is a Tillyian perspective that contends that state elites originally operated as protection 
rackets, offering security in return for payments. Thirdly, a political economy perspective regards 
the emergence of the modern state as intimately tied to modern capitalism and as an institution 
                                                     
73 Ghani et. al 2006.  
74 Ibid.  
75 For instance, the cutting of rice subsidies to the army is held to be a triggering factor to the 1997 military coup in Sierra 
Leone. Similarly, the dismissal of 600 military personnel in East Timor served as the catalyst for an outbreak of violence 
in the country during spring 2006.  
76 Milliken and Krause ( 2003).  
77 Doorndos (2003), Khan (2005).  
78 Milliken and Krause (2003).  
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particularly well fitted to it.79 The Tillyian and the political economy perspectives offer a corrective 
to overly liberal accounts of state formation processes; rather than an eventual triumph of the public 
good over particular and selfish agendas, state formation is seen to be driven by specific social 
groups and interests.  It would seem that external support to ‘statebuilding’ would have much to 
gain from incorporating such historical analysis.  Rather than attempting to identify a set of 
universal attributes seen necessary for the materialisation of statehood, more focus should be on 
identifying the key social and political groups that challenge or support developmental transitions 
and how this relates to other, and potentially conflicting objectives of stability or legitimacy.   
Conclusion  
The fragile states agenda centres around important issues: the politics of development, the evident 
corruption of many Southern governments and the inability of many states to monopolise violence 
and provide security for their citizens. In some ways the agenda represents an advancement of 
donor thinking and practice. The emphasis on contextual analysis and the need to improve, rather 
than circumvent, state structures is a significant step in the right direction, as is greater commitment 
to field presence,80 differentiated responses to different situations and improved donor coordination.  
 
However the fragile states agenda makes several problematic assumptions that need to be revisited: 
Its use of the CPIA indicators as a proxy for the state’s role in development offers obvious 
advantages in terms of operational guidance. Nonetheless, using the CPIA indicators to determine 
developmental state failure is not widely accepted within the development field.  At one level, this 
concerns the policy content of the indicators, which the historical experience of East Asian 
developers does not support. However there are also problems related to the very idea that change 
can be achieved through the promotion of a set policy and institutional model, without taking into 
account structural factors at the intersection of politics and economics. Ultimately, the promotion of 
a fixed reform programme seriously negates the fragile states agenda’s claim to apply ‘political 
economy’ analysis and leads the agenda to adopt a simplistic framing of good and bad leaders.  
 
Secondly the agenda’s  tendency to equate strategies designed to address its distinct concept of 
‘state failure’, rooted in development discourse, as an overall solution to all aspects of ‘state failure’ 
must be seen as part of a problematic meta-narrative of state failure, where different concerns rooted 
in development and security discourses are conflated as a singular issue. Representing their efforts 
to address developmental state failure as inherently supporting of the state’s ability to contain 
violence will be conducive to the institutional interests of development agencies, but it is not 
supported by empirical experience. By framing all issues as mutually reinforcing, the security –
development nexus has impeded more nuanced thinking on the interrelationship between violence 
and development.  The immediate challenge for the fragile state agenda will be to move beyond 
such weaknesses and to assess the causes of ‘state failure(s)’ through historically grounded analysis 
of country specific dynamics. Such an approach will be operationally more challenging but is likely 







                                                     
79 Giddens in Milliken and Krause (2003) p. 8. 
80For instance a recent LICUS  paper states the Bank’s intention to increase field staff considerably (World Bank 2006a).  
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not only does such failure affect development outcomes, fragile states are also 
associated with violent conflicts and related security threats. The paper argues 
the fragile state concept must be critically reconsidered on both accounts. First, 
whether the concept can be said to capture the dynamics and policies associated 
with so-called developmental states is doubtful. Second, equating a states 
ability to promote development with its capacity to prevent and reduce violent 
conflict, while a drawing upon a common conflation within the so-called security-
development nexus, is not supported by historical evidence.
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